You know this of course, but politics in the 20th century was characterized by a Democratic party that maintained total control of the house and usually of the senate (sometimes to an overwhelming degree), but was itself divided between Southern and Northern factions with very difficult economic and social values. That was certainly a coalition of two thirds against the other third (the resentful and the truly marginalized vs the business elite), and it's definitively fallen apart. Who knows what's next! But I do feel like we can probably work something out...
I find the prominence of the nation-state in this discussion a little odd. Why is that the locus of the crisis rather than democracy or capitalism or globalization or something else?
Also, I would suggest a somewhat different description of the crisis. Democracy over the past 100 years has mostly had 3 phases -- boom, nostalgia for the boom, and crisis. The central challenge is that the modern state is very powerful, and modern populations disagree widely as to what should be done with that power. That conflict was resolved by the postwar boom, and then postponed by the hope that the boom could be resurrected. But as it becomes clear that it cannot be resurrected, that central conflict has returned.
And yes, I think the waning of the postwar boom and a complete inability of modern states to envision how to sustain its beneficience is a big part of this.
My assessment is somewhat more pessimistic -- the boom is the anomaly and the problem is figuring how to sustain support for democracy in a diverse society without the support of 5% growth every year.
I think because there is such a strong spatial element to these conflicts--rural/periurban or small city/large city--and because it's about control over a *national* territory. When you resolve down to localities, the 'thirds' dissolve, mostly. There's still conflict in small towns in the American South, for example, but it stops being a mirror of the national-level struggle for power. And it seems to me that some of the "battle of 3" is occurring even in non-democracies, unless they're small enough to not have a hinterland per se (Singapore) or they're essentially subnational enclaves trapped within nations (Lesotho). Globalization is I think a major cause of the current crisis, though. And democracy is especially at risk because it's built around building shifting majorities and assuming that shifting minorities will accept and legitimize majoritarian outcomes (and try to make deals with or seek consideration from the majorities). I think that's part of what's driving the desire for authoritarianism in states where the rural/excluded thirds feel as if they are simply outnumbered when it comes to achieving popular majorities in a national-level vote.
I guess I agree that the geographical arrangement is relevant here, but that seems broader than the nation-state. If Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire were still around, they would have those same thirds, as do places that are not really nation-states in the classic sense like the US or Lebanon.
Yes, though I think more inclusive empires like those faced those issues in different ways--perhaps more adaptively in certain respects--than nation-states do.
You know this of course, but politics in the 20th century was characterized by a Democratic party that maintained total control of the house and usually of the senate (sometimes to an overwhelming degree), but was itself divided between Southern and Northern factions with very difficult economic and social values. That was certainly a coalition of two thirds against the other third (the resentful and the truly marginalized vs the business elite), and it's definitively fallen apart. Who knows what's next! But I do feel like we can probably work something out...
I find the prominence of the nation-state in this discussion a little odd. Why is that the locus of the crisis rather than democracy or capitalism or globalization or something else?
Also, I would suggest a somewhat different description of the crisis. Democracy over the past 100 years has mostly had 3 phases -- boom, nostalgia for the boom, and crisis. The central challenge is that the modern state is very powerful, and modern populations disagree widely as to what should be done with that power. That conflict was resolved by the postwar boom, and then postponed by the hope that the boom could be resurrected. But as it becomes clear that it cannot be resurrected, that central conflict has returned.
And yes, I think the waning of the postwar boom and a complete inability of modern states to envision how to sustain its beneficience is a big part of this.
My assessment is somewhat more pessimistic -- the boom is the anomaly and the problem is figuring how to sustain support for democracy in a diverse society without the support of 5% growth every year.
I think because there is such a strong spatial element to these conflicts--rural/periurban or small city/large city--and because it's about control over a *national* territory. When you resolve down to localities, the 'thirds' dissolve, mostly. There's still conflict in small towns in the American South, for example, but it stops being a mirror of the national-level struggle for power. And it seems to me that some of the "battle of 3" is occurring even in non-democracies, unless they're small enough to not have a hinterland per se (Singapore) or they're essentially subnational enclaves trapped within nations (Lesotho). Globalization is I think a major cause of the current crisis, though. And democracy is especially at risk because it's built around building shifting majorities and assuming that shifting minorities will accept and legitimize majoritarian outcomes (and try to make deals with or seek consideration from the majorities). I think that's part of what's driving the desire for authoritarianism in states where the rural/excluded thirds feel as if they are simply outnumbered when it comes to achieving popular majorities in a national-level vote.
I guess I agree that the geographical arrangement is relevant here, but that seems broader than the nation-state. If Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire were still around, they would have those same thirds, as do places that are not really nation-states in the classic sense like the US or Lebanon.
Yes, though I think more inclusive empires like those faced those issues in different ways--perhaps more adaptively in certain respects--than nation-states do.